The Short Contract with a Long Shadow: Kuminga, Grimes, and the implications of a Qualifying Offer
This analysis is closely related to my previous post. Linked here.
While these two posts analyze two distinct paths that diverge from Restricted Free Agency — they are best understood together, as some context of the pressure that I imagine players and clubs are going through this offseason.
This article explores the salary cap implications that will arise if Jonathan Kuminga and Quentin Grimes sign their respective Qualifying Offers with the Warriors and the 76ers. My intent is to model both teams' salary cap positions, from the present through the 2026 NBA Offseason, in order to better understand the upside and risks associated with this rarely-utilized salary cap mechanic.
For the purpose of this article, two assumptions have been made:
1. Kuminga and Grimes accept their respective Qualifying Offers; and
2. The 2026 Salary Cap rises 7% over 2025, to $165,472,076.
A Qualifying Offer is a fully-guaranteed one season contract with a pre-determined value that follows the completion of a player’s Rookie Scale contract (“QO”). The QO is a fast track to Unrestricted Free Agency but it comes with two stipulations that make it relatively unattractive -- and not to mention, rare. In the last five years, only Denzel Valentine and Cam Thomas have signed their QOs.
The initial deadline to accept the QO is October 1, 2025; only two weeks from the time of this posting.
Kuminga and Grimes’ QO and subsequent Cap Holds are as follows:
Qualifying Offer Mechanics
The QO is subject to two unique cap restrictions under the CBA.
A signed QO comes with an implicit no-trade clause. Because the QO is a one-year Contract, and the player would have full Bird rights following the expiration of the QO, the target player cannot be traded without the player’s consent. (Art. VII (8)(b)) However -- at the time of signing only -- the player and their club can agree to waive this implied no-trade clause. (This clause in the CBA is rarely implicated, and it was the very same clause that was most recently referenced with Jaxson Hayes’ third minimum contract in a row)
Even if the parties agree to waive the implied NTC, the second paragraph of this clause imposes a significant trade-deterrent for a signed QO. If the player is traded during the QO, then the acquiring team loses the player's Bird Rights. This is because a trade during the QO is considered as changing teams via Free Agency, and "not by means of a trade." (Art. VII (8)(b)) This means that any acquiring team would have zero contractual “advantage” at retaining the target player, reducing the in-season trade market to near-zero, aside from teams motivated to shed multi-year commitments for an expiring contract. In short, trading for a player on a QO is an expensive roundabout way to Unrestricted Free Agency, where you would have the same contractual rights as if you never gave up assets for the player.
Once the QO season is complete, the player enters Unrestricted Free Agency. At this point, there are no lingering rookie-scale implications – the player is Unrestricted and free to field offers from any club.
While signing the QO may be the quickest path to Unrestricted Free Agency, it is important to remember that a player and club do not get to this point in the CBA without two to three years of disagreement on the player’s role and contractual valuation. This highlights that, at this juncture: 1) the former club is the only one with Bird Rights; and 2) the player and their club are not on the best terms. While the former club may be able to offer the most money, for the longest term, and exceed the cap to do so, they also had several year’s worth of opportunities to get a deal done and both parties clearly decided that QO was preferable to whatever was on the table.
Warriors’ and 76ers’ cap positions
Below is the Warriors’ and 76er’s cap sheet. For the sake of this section, I draw your attention to the red box in each sheet:
Golden State’s Cap Sheet
Philadelphia’s Cap Sheet
Given the long-term cap commitments to top-end talent (and making the large assumption that both teams will field competitive rosters for 2026-27), I anticipate both teams prioritizing the acquisition of playoff-caliber role players to keep their over-the-cap momentum as high as possible. While Kuminga and Grimes could feasibly fill that role for Golden State and Philadelphia, given the marred relationship (see above), finding a new team for them seems like the natural move. Notably, only two players in NBA history have returned to their Qualifying Offer team: Spencer Hawes to the 76ers; and Miles Bridges to the Hornets. (Credit to Dan Feldman, Dunc'd on Prime)
And the only mechanic that can turn this into a win-win-win situation is the Sign-and-Trade.
The Win-Win-Win Potential
Any team with Bird Rights on an Unrestricted Free Agent can sign, and subsequently trade, said player to a new team. In order to utilize this trade mechanic, the contract must be: for three or four seasons; season one must be fully guaranteed; and the new team can only acquire the player through the following cap mechanics:
Room under the Cap
Traded Player Exception(s)
Bi-Annual Exception ($5.494M)
Taxpayer MLE ($5.685M)
Disabled Player Exception (value is relative to the disabled player's contract value, but is capped at $15.091M)
The moment the transaction is completed, the new team is hard-capped at the First Apron ($209.662M). The former team is hard-capped at the Second Apron the moment they acquire a player through a TPE generated from this Sign-and-Trade. However if the former team does not acquire a player, they will not be hard capped. (The 76ers accomplished this in 2024 when they S&T'd Hield to the Warriors. See)
Given the scope of this article, we will only be analyzing Sign-and-Trades facilitated through the acquiring team's: 1) Room under the cap; and 2) Traded Player Exception(s).
Sign-and-Trade Scenarios
Scenario 1 - The Washington Wizards acquire Grimes via a Sign-and-Trade into Room.
Washington is a great example of how an acquiring team could also "win," despite having to part with assets. Washington has a series of expiring Rookie Scales in the coming three to four seasons.
2026-27: ~$65M in expiring UFAs. One expiring Rookie Scale (Malaki Branham).
2027-28: Two expiring Rookie Scales (Bilal Coulibaly; and Cam Whitmore).
2028-29: Five expiring Rookie Scales (Alex Sarr; Bub Carrington; AJ Johnson; Kyshawn George; Dillon Jones)
2029-2030: Two expiring Rookie Scales (Tre Johnson; and Will Riley)
While it would be quite difficult to game out a range for each of those expiring players, we can easily see a position where Washington would want to front-load, or potentially roller-coaster, a contractual structure in order to accommodate for a pair of large cap hits in 2027-28 and 2028-29.
To illustrate this point, let's assume Washington is dead-set on Grimes, and that Grimes is deadset on signing a $100M/4 year deal with Washington. Washington's best efforts at signing Grimes while accommodating for anticipated extensions in 2027-28 and 2028-29 would look like:
As you can see, the material gain is… well, quite slim. In short, acquiring Grimes via Bird Rights would generate $858,150, or roughly 0.5% of cap space, in cap relief for 2028-29. While that is not significant at the moment, in 2028, the Wizards may be several years into a strong homegrown core and flirting with the Luxury Tax; they may be considering crossing the 'salary cap event horizon' where every cap commitment must either maintain their over-the-cap momentum or be able to contribute towards playoff wins. While the savings of a Sign-and-Trade would be quite small, they are investing into late-game flexibility which can otherwise only be bought at a premium.
The only question remains then: "Well, what would that premium be worth?" Perhaps in the same theme of consolidating salary, the Wizards send out a package surrounding their highest paid multi-year commitment in Corey Kispert, plus a First Round Pick and a Second Round Pick.
Washington does this to acquire a solid two-way combo guard who can space the floor and complement their young perimeter while shedding long term salary commitments. Philadelphia recoups a rotation piece and draft capital in exchange for a player who is already halfway out the door. Grimes does this to get his payday and a bigger role on a promising team.
Scenario 2) The Utah Jazz acquire Kuminga via a Sign-and-Trade via Traded Player Exception
Disclaimer: Of the 14 active Trade Exceptions, only three are greater than the NT-MLE of $15.091M. None of the three situations makes too much sense, but I selected Utah for this scenario because their position is a great illustration of the pertinent cap implications. Below are the three Trade Exceptions and what an applicable maximum-value contract would consist of:
Utah is unique in that: 1) they will have enough Room to sign a UFA; and 2) they also have a Trade Exception large enough to facilitate a Sign-and-Trade. If Utah could negotiate a deal for Kuminga that fits within their $18.380M Trade Exception, then they should use the Trade Exception and send the trade in as late as possible.
In doing so, they can utilize their cap space (likely $40M+) to acquire other UFAs, subsequently exceeding the cap, only to then acquire Kuminga via Sign-and-Trade into their Exception. Whereas if they use their Trade Exception first, they will be left with approximately $20M in Room. And once the trade is complete, Utah would be hard-capped at the First Apron.
Given that Utah has Room, and would be free to acquire Kuminga without any assistance from Golden State, it is hard to imagine the Warriors would have any leverage in this scenario. Obviously, the Warriors could refuse to play ball and force Utah to acquire via Unrestricted Free Agency; however I would wager that Utah losing $18.380M in Room next year is far less grave to them than Golden State letting Kuminga walk for nothing. Utah could reasonably send Kyle Anderson and a Second to facilitate this deal. Though, I imagine Golden State would probably prefer to have Utah waive Anderson before his guarantee date and just send the pick over; or possibly re-route Anderson to another team and attach additional draft capital.
While this exact scenario is quite unrealistic, I would not discount the very real possibility that Kuminga is dealt via a Sign-and-Trade into a TPE that has yet to be generated. Kuminga did field some trade interest around the league this offseason; and those very same teams would have eight to nine months to generate a ~$23-25M TPE which is very possible.
Conclusion
Through the unspooling of rules surrounding QOs and the resulting cap implications, we can see how risky and costly this juncture of the CBA is for all parties involved -- and why it is such a rarely invoked option. As such, I think it would be shocking to see both Kuminga and Grimes sign the QO.
If Kuminga or Grimes do sign their QO, their current suitors are limited to:
While either Kuminga or Grimes signing with a new club via non-Bird Rights is the simplest and most likely outcome, a Sign-and-Trade with full Bird Rights might be the only win-win-win possibility. Keep an eye out for any clubs that generate TPEs >$20M this season.